Bridesmaid

We’ve heard for eons that “Low bond yields justify high equity valuations.” Value-conscious investors might have described this conundrum another way: “Low future returns in one asset class justify low future returns in another.” (Mysteriously, only the first rendition became a CNBC catch-phrase.)

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As noted, the Bridesmaid sector strategy has underperformed what has become a more difficult benchmark in five of the last six years. Those poor results have cut the annualized excess return of this approach to just +2.1% since 1991. 

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Once again, the idea is to dispense with macroeconomic trends, sector fundamentals, comparative valuations, and to base sector selection solely on the prior year’s total returns.

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Overall, five of the seven assets available for the Bridesmaid strategy have underperformed the S&P 500 over the long-term, and three (Treasury Bonds, Gold, and Commodities) lagged by 390 basis points or more per year.

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The “risk-adjusted returns” concept faded further into obscurity in 2021, with the year’s largest drawdown in the S&P 500 a mere -5.2%. But for those who still care about risk, the Bridesmaid strategy—though it often holds highly-volatile stuff like Gold, Commodities, and Small Caps—has been only about 1% more volatile than the S&P 500.

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For those not blessed with clairvoyance, we’ve developed an asset selection strategy that’s done very well, historically, compared to the “naïve” AANA Portfolio and even against the almighty S&P 500. We’re not implying that investors dump their valuation models, economic forecasts, or their intuition. But they should recognize that price momentum tends to persist—not just among stocks and industry groups—but at the asset-class level as well.

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We’ve worried over the last several years whether momentum and other “alpha” factors have become exploited to the point of diminishing returns. It’s an arms race out there...

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Our work on the annual “momentum effect” dates back 15 years, and was originally based on equity sectors rather than asset classes. The hypothetical approach is to entirely dispense macroeconomic trends, sector fundamentals, and valuations, and base the allocation decision exclusively on momentum.

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“Risk-adjusted returns” were all the rage after the Great Financial Crisis. Now that such returns are likely to become relevant again, naturally, there’s little scrutiny of them.

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With last year’s Bridesmaid (REITs) having laid an egg, the long-term “alpha” of the Bridesmaid portfolio narrowed to +3.7% from a bit over +5% (annualized) when we first published this study more than a decade ago.

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In the extreme case where one possesses no other information beyond last year’s total returns, the best single-asset strategy has been to buy the second-best performer (the “Bridesmaid”) and hold it for the next twelve months in hopes that the prior year’s momentum will carry it through. That approach has beaten the S&P 500 by 3.7% annualized over the past 48 years. 

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2019 was the fourth consecutive year of underperformance by the annual Bridesmaid sector pick. Those poor results have trimmed the annualized “alpha” of the strategy to just +2.2% since 1991.

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Our work on the Bridesmaid momentum effect dates back to 2006, and was originally based on equity sectors rather than asset classes. Again, the hypothetical approach is to ignore macroeconomic trends, sector fundamentals, valuations, and the like, and to base sector selection solely on the prior year’s sector total return rankings.

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We know that risk measurements have become passé, what with the S&P 500 having annualized at +13.6% in the last decade without a single drop of 20%. But the Bridesmaid strategy looks great relative to the available asset classes on a risk-adjusted basis.

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Here are the historical annual performance results for the hypothetical Bridesmaid strategy.

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Momentum strategies aren’t for everyone. Still, contrarians should recognize that buying the prior year’s worst performing sector for a one-year hold has been an underperforming proposition over the long term.

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Our analysis of the Bridesmaid effect originated in 2006, but was based on S&P 500 sectors rather than asset classes.

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The best we can say about last year’s Bridesmaid asset—the S&P 500—is that it did not underperform “the S&P 500.”

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After a bad market year like 2018, there’s a natural instinct for allocators to skew portfolios toward assets with poor recent performance. History suggests, though, that one shouldn’t make a habit of buying an asset on the basis of price weakness alone.

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Table 5 shows annual performance results for the Cheapest Sector strategy under all four rebalancing frequencies, along with the lowest P/E sector for the annual version of the strategy.

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